From the Eclipse of Reason to Communicative Rationality by Hohendahl, Peter Uwe
TRANSFORMATIONS 
comparative study of social transformations 
CSST 
WORKING PAPERS 
The University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor 
"From the Eclipse of Reason to 
Communicative Rationality" 





Paper #54 1 
Peter Uwe Hohendahl 
file: eclipse.rnic 
From the Eclipse of Reason to Commu~cative Rationality 
By referring to Horkheimer's 1947 study -n and Jurgen Habermas's more 
recent The Theory of Communicative Action the title of my lecture suggests a significant 
transformation within the Frankfbrt School between the late 1940s and the 1980s, a change that 
touches in particular on the core concepts of reason andlor rationality. Moreover, it reflects a 
specific understanding of the way in which this transformation occurred, namely a replacement of 
the first generation's critique of instrumental reason by a more positive and clearly more 
differentiated approach to the concept of reason in the work of the second generation, notably in 
the writings of Jiirgen Habermas. In this account, which is shared by most of the members of the 
second generation, the history of the Fraddu-t School has to be read as a process of overcoming 
and also of theoretical improvement. The most common narrative has been tc describe it as a 
transition fiom the pessimism of Horkheimer and Adorno to the more pragmatic and realistic 
attitude of Habermas and his disciples. Another way of looking at the development would be (in 
Haberrnasian terms) to defme it as a passage fiom metaphysical to post-metaphysical thought. 
What these narratives have in common is their linear and teleological direction. They assume that 
Critical Theory has moved through a number of phases until it W y  arrived at a theory of 
communicative rationality which not only redraws the boundaries of reason but also offers a very 
different outlook at contemporary social and political problems. 
It is not my intention to reject this narrative out of hand. It is a convenient and, at least up 
I 
to a point, persuasive account of the theoretical development within the Frankfiut School after 
Word War 11. Moreover, it represents the perspective of important insiders, among them 
Habermas and Axel Hometh, who have repeatedly emphasized a s imcant  paradigm shift 
between the older and the younger generation that occurred during the 1970s. According to this 
model, the early work of Habermas, for example The Structural Transformation of the Public 
S~here (1962) and Knowledze and Human Interest (1968) would still belong to the older 
paradigm, while Legitimation Crisis (1973) and The Theory of Communicative Action (1981) 
would be part of the post-metaphysical paradigm that then becomes the standard for the third 
generation of critical theorists. 
Yet also external obsenrers such as Fredric Jameson, who is much closer to Adorno and 
Benjamin and clearly not much in sympathy with Habermas's later work, have acknowledged and 
commented on the paradigm shift, if only to reject it as a loss of the original impetus of Critical 
Theory. In his reading of Adorno's work in Late Mancism (1 989) he pleaded for Critical Theory's 
original project as it was defined by Horkheimer and Adorno in the 1940s and later worked out in 
the mature writings of Adorno. Similarly, the recent work of Peter Biirger, who had more or less 
adopted a Habermasian perspective in Theory of the Avant-Garde (1974), has reassimilated 
themes and forms of Adorno's thought, in combination with a stronger acknowledgement of 
French poststucturalist theory. These voices suggest the possibility of a different understanding of 
the theoretical development of the FrankfUrt School, a more complex configuration in which the 
older theoretical model is not simply replaced but reintegrated, possibly even used as a challenge 
to the conception of communicative rationality. In such a configuration the work of Albrecht 
Wellmer certainly comes to mind, who never absolutely abandoned the theoretical foundations of 
the first generation and has continued to emphasize the importance of Adorno's aesthetic theory in 
the context of the postmodernism debate. 
There are two additional elements that do not easily fit into the picture of a linear 
development fiom a critique of reason to communicative rationality. First, there is the case of 
Herbert Marcuse. The work of Marcuse, which spanned three decades, did not foreground an 
eclipse of reason or a loss of belief in the possibility of revolutionary change. During the 1960s he 
became one of the most outspoken revolutionary social critics in ihis country who argued that 
the structures of advanced capitalist societies were not immutable. And it is undeniable that 
Marcuse also influenced the German Left, including young Habermas. In fact, it was partly 
1 
e- through Marcuse's writings that the early Habermas could reformulate the project of Critical 
:I, Theory in Gennany, especially in opposition to the stance that Max Horkheirner considered as 
appropriate for West Germany. Second, there is the case of Walter Benjamin, or more precisely 
- the case of his impact in the 1970s and 1980s. Benjamin's reception in Germany (or in the United 
. . States for that matter) does not easily fit the evolutionary narrative I have outlined before. During 
the 1960s and 1970s he became the hero for the radical Left when they became disappointed with 
the political position of the Frankfbrt School (including that of Habermas). And later he was 
sometimes seen as an altogether isolated figure whose writings anticipated the philosophical and 
cultural criticism of French poststructuralism. Habermas's response to the radical Marxist 
appropriation of Benjamin was telling. He argued that it was Adorno rather than Benjamin who 
had carried on the Marxist tradition. As a result, Habermas margmahzed Benjamin's importance 
for Critical Theory. The point I want to make is that Benjamin's multi-faceted reception is at odds 
with the official narrative of the school. 
How, then, do we conceptualize the development of Critical Theory after World War II? 
First of all, I want to suggest that if we want to apply an evolutionary model, we have to 
distinguish at least three phases, namely the early years of t?e Institute for Social Research, the 
restructuring of the project after 1944, and finally the paradigmatic shift that occurred after the 
death of Adorno during the 1970s under the leadership of Jiirgen Habemas. Moreover, we will 
have to keep in mind that this model tends to eliminate or marginalize counter-tendencies or 
moments of repetition and recurrence. 
Before I focus on the best-known works of the older generation such as Eclipse of Reason 
and Dialectic of Enlightenment I want to begin therefore with the project of the Institute for 
Social Research as it emerged during the 1930s.. For this purpose I will offer a symptomatic 
reading of one of Herbert Marcuse's early essays which attempts to define the method and the 
goal of Critical Theory. In character and intent it remains close to Horkheimer's more famous 
essay "Traditional and Critical Theory." In "Philosophy and Critical Theory" (1937) Marcuse 
argues for a special and distinct status of critical theory vis-a-vis philosophy. Yet the emphasis is 
placed on those aspects of the German idealist tradition that Critical Theory has appropriated. It 
is important to note that for Marcuse modem European philosophy contains a critical element. 
"Reason was established as a critical tribunal." (Negations, 136). Thus Marcuse quotes Hegel's - 
lectures on the history of philosophy to underline the link between philosophy and freedom. "To 
speculative philosophy belongs the knowledge that freedom is that alone that is true of mind." 
(1360. For Marcuse the philosophical concept of reason (Vernunft) therefore remains a limited 
but clearly positive asset of the project of fieedom with which he identifies. The limitations have 
to do with two aspects, namely, first, philosophy's blindness for the material aspects of life, which 
only an economic theory can conceptualize, and, second, the way in which reason by way of 
philosophical reflection constitutes the world. Marcuse criticizes philosophy's inability to offer a 
truly critical approach to the actual development of the world and argues: "For at its conclusion 
[philosophy] anives at nothing that did not already exist 'in itsew at the beginning. The absence of 
concrete development appeared to this philosophy as the greatest benefit." (139) The critical 
moment that philosophy cannot produce by itself emerges in connection with the struggle of 
oppressed groups for better living conditions. This means that "the realization of reason no longer 
needs to be restricted to pure thought and will" (141); instead, only through the intertwinement of 
the pressure of material conditions, on the one hand, and the conception of reason as a "critical 
tribunal", on the other, does a truly critical theory materialize that is bent on social transformation. 
Thus critical theory, unlike philosophy, derives its progressive tendencies fiom its involvement 
with the present social process. 
The proximity of this definition of critical theory to Marxian theory is hard to overlook. 
Yet it is important to note that Marcuse does not want critical theory to be cohsed  with 
economics, i.e., with certain orthodox forms of Marxism for which German idealism is nothing 
but bourgeois ideology. While Marcuse agrees with Marxism's characterization of the goal, that is 
freedom of the masses, he holds on to the contribution of philosophy in this struggle and therefore 
he also holds on to the concept of reason as it was defined and sustained by the philosophical 
tradition. The universality of rational concepts, although they are abstract, remains for Marcuse a 
necessary correlate to the process of material changes and revolutionary transformations. To put 
it differently, Marcuse perceives of reason's utopian moment as an aid and not as a hindrance for 
the process of emancipation. Hence he notes: "Critical theory's interest in the liberation of 
mankind binds it to certain ancient truths. It is at one with philosophy in maintaining that man can 
be more than a manipulable subject in the production process of class society." (1 53) 
This argument implies not only that Critical Theory has to take cognizance of Kant and 
Hegel but also that it should recuperate a concept of reason brought forth by these philosophers. 
Nowhere does the essay suggest that the concept of reason is in itself problematic or is unsuitable 
for the process of emancipation. While Marcuse in his later work, for instance in One-Dimensional 
Man (1964), differentiates more clearly between reason as 'Vernunft' and instmental reason, he -
continued to link reason and liberation and thereby also to rely on the revolutionary potential of 
reason. This is, I believe, the strand of Critical Theory that Jiirgen Habermas picked up in the 
1960s in his initial opposition to the late work of his teachers in Frankfirt. 
Habermas's first major project, i.e., The Structural Transformation of the Public S~here 
has a pivotal position in the development of the FrankfUrt School after the war. It is a perplexing 
and ambivalent book since its epistemology is certainly indebted to Horkheimer and Adorno, 
while its politics are only partly compatible with the teaching of the older generation. It was not 
accidental therefore that they rejected the study and forced Habermas to seek his Habilitation at 
the University of Marburg. The moment one scrutinizes the study more carefdly it becomes 
apparent that Habermas had actually written an implied critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Not only did he offer a much more positive evaluation of the European Enlightenment and its 
philosophical accomplishments than Adorno and Horkheimer, he also developed a political 
perspective that his teachers were unwilling to share. While they might have agreed on the need 
for democracy in Germany, their assessment of the necessary strategies differed, although more 
implicitly than explicitly. In psychological and political terms, then, Structural Transformation 
was too radical and Marxist for Horkheimer's taste, and Dialectic of Enlightenment too 
pessimistic for the early Habermas. In particular they clashed over the question of modernity. 
While Horkheimer and Adorno, following Nietzsche, wrote a harsh and almost unrestricted 
indictment of modernity, Habermas offered a first version of what he later came to call "the 
incomplete project of modernity." Although his critique of the decline of the public sphere in the 
late 19th century is clearly indebted to Dialectic of Enlightenment, especially to the famous 
chapter on the culture industry, he ultimately wanted to explore the ground for a rehabilitation of 
the public sphere or, to put it differently, he meant to investigate the political and social 
institutions on which a radical democracy could be built. In this context, as I will try to 
?". - demonstrate, the concept of reason as well as the classical Geman philosophical tradition from 
. ?  -. .-. Kant to Manr take on a different meaning than in Dialectic of Enli~htenment .
Habemas's implicit disagreement with his teachers had to do with their relentless critique 
c- ..., of the very concept of reason that had sustained the essay of Herbert Marcuse and, more broadly 
. - speaking, the Institute's project of the 1930s. Both in historical and systematic terms the concept 
of reason came under attack as the cardinal failure of Western civilization, which had 
"progressed" from its early stages couched in mythology to the nominalism of modem positivism, 
on the one hand, and from the human sacrifice of early civilizations to the mass murder of 
contemporary fascism, on the other. The Mure of reason is the central argument of the book. The 
introduction speaks of the "self-destruction of the enlightenment" (xi) and argues "We are wholly 
convinced-and therein lies our petitio princzj~iii--that social fieedom is inseparable from 
enlightened thought. Nevertheless, we believe that we have just as clearly recognized that the 
notion of this very way of thinking , no less than the actual historic forms-the social institutions- 
with which it is intenvoven, already contains the seed of the reversal universally apparent today" 
(xiii). 
What is wrong with reason as it functions in modem discourse? Where do Horkheimer 
and Adorno perceive the shortcomings and problems? Actually, they give a number of different 
reasons, some of them have to do with its context and functions in modernity, others are linked 
more intimately to its genealogy. Reason, they note, has lost its transcending quality and its 
relation to truth; its application to scientific and social problems is exclusively determined by 
pragmatic concerns that are rooted in strategies for survival. This line of the argument is closely 
connected with the problem of commodification, that is, the problem that "thought becomes a 
commodity, and language the means of promoting that commodity" (xii), obviously an echo from 
Lukacs's analysis of reification in Histoc and Class Consciousness. But where Lukacs grounded 
his analysis in the modern phenomenon of commodity fetishism, Horkheimer and Adorno develop 
a much broader critique going back as far as the original split between subject and object in the 
era of mythology. Turning against the historical European Enlightenment, for instance Kant, they 
argue that the formation of the subject is not the result of autonomy but the consequence of 
adaptation to survive through the domination of nature. In this perspective the self-interpretation 
of the historical Enlightenment, its stress on humanism, comes across as an ideology that served 
darker purposes under the aegis of modem capitalism and imperialism. 
Horkheimer and Adorno were quite aware of the inner contradiction of their study. 
Despite their all-out attack on the enlightenment they insisted on the legitimacy of substantive 
reason as well, a performative contradiction that Adorno later tried to work out in Negative 
Dialectics (1 966) where the epistemological consequences of the earlier critique are finally 
brought into the foreground. But at that point the project of the second generation was already 
emerging, although the FrankfUrt School still presented a common eont to the larger public. In 
their critique of the radical students, for instance, Habermas and Adorno worked out a shared 
position. But the appearance of a common fiont was deceptive, for when one looks more closely 
at the arguments that Adorno and Habermas developed in dealing with student unrest, it becomes 
obvious that Adorno's resistance to revolutionary action was a principal one while Habermas's 
criticism was determined by strategic considerations. Adorno was convinced that the time for 
revolutionary mass movements had passed, that they would be counter-productive in the age of 
late capitalism. Habermas, on the other hand, believed that the time for revolution had not yet 
come, that the students were mistaken when they expected a major revolutionary transformation 
in the immediate future. 
This brings us back to the early work of Habemas. Both Structural Transformation and 
his early essays collected in the volume Theory and Practice (1963) are grounded in a concept of 
history that is largely indebted to Marx seen through the lenses of Western Marxism and the older 
Critical Theory. To some extent, I believe, the early Habermas recuperated the project of the 
1930s, however, with a much more critical eye for those moments of hlarx's work that had to be 
revised. Along these lines Habermas reconstructed the history of the public sphere by 
demonstrating its determination through material conditions. In sum, the bourgeois public sphere 
rose and fell with the class that had promoted it. At the same time Habermas in his reconstruction 
of the public sphere emphasized the need for a normative grounding of the public sphere. By 
d e h g  the ideal bourgeois public sphere (Offentlichkeit) as a discursive field based on reason he 
set up a tension between historical reality and the ideal. Using the public sphere of the 
Enlightenment and in particular its definition in the work of Kant as the trope for this ideal, 
Habermas moved away f?om the historico-philosophical (geschichtsphilosophisch) model of the 
older Critical Theory, at least in some respects, although clearly not consistently and 
systematically. When Habermas some thrty years later wrote a'new introduction for the 1990 
edition of Structural Transformation he clarified precisely this point when he argued that in the 
1970s he became dissatisfied with the theoretical underpinnings of his first book and therefore in 
The Theory of Communicative Action attempted a very different kind of theoretical grounding. 
Historical hermeneutics was replaced by linguistic theory and normative considerations received 
clearly preference over historical ones. 
Before I sketch Habermas's path to communicative rationality, however, I want to mention 
in passing at least that Habermas's solution to the implicit tension between historical and 
normative aspects in Structural Transformation was not the only one within the Frankfbrt School. 
In their Public Sphere and Experience of 1972 Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge proposed a very 
different solution.. In their critique of Habermas they radicalized the historical approach by 
charging that he had failed to understand the deeply ideological nature of the bourgeois public 
sphere. Their reconstruction not only broadened the scope of the investigation by including the 
proletarian public sphere, it also reinforced the Marxist tenets and therefore argued that the liberal 
public sphere could not be recuperated at all. By insisting on the radical historicity of the public 
sphere (or the configuration of competing public spheres), Negt and Kluge meant to block, in 
epistemological as well as political terms, the normative bent of Habermas's theory. 
Schematically speaking, by the end of the 1960s Habermas was left with two fhdamental 
problems: on the one hand, he had to develop a theoretical perspective that would enable him to 
10 
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describe and address social and political problems; on the other hand, he had to formulate a theory 
that would allow him to articulate normative moral and ethical issues. For a short span of time, 
Habermas was convinced that the common denominator for these projects would be a 
combination of an advanced form of philosophical hermeneutics (a critical extension of the work 
that Hans-Georg Gadarner had done) and critical reflection in the tradition of ideology critique. In 
this version theory and material interests are linked through the concept of "erkenntnisleitende 
Interessen" which are inevitably at the bottom.of human communication and social action. It is 
noteworthy that in th~s version the concept of reason is differentiated along the lines of basic 
forms of human orientation. Building on the methodological differences between the natural 
sciences, the social sciences and the humanities, Habermas argued that the traditional 
understanding of theory that dominated philosophy fiom Plato to Husserl treated theory and 
interests Msely as a strict opposition since it failed to analyze the hidden premises of knowledge. 
Instead of eradicating human interests as constitutive for knowledge, Habermas proposed a tri- 
part structure as the basis for the development of knowledge. "The specific viewpoints fiom 
which, with transcendental necessity, we apprehend reality ground three categories of possible 
knowledge: information that expands our power of technical control, interpretations that make 
possible the orientation of action within in common traditions, and analyses that fiee 
consciousness fiom its dependence on hypostatized powers. These viewpoints originate in the 
interest structures of a species that is linked in its roots to definitive means of social organization: 
work, language, and power." (Knowledge, 3 13) 
What Habermas gained fiom this approach was a rather different take on the problem of 
reason. The tri-part structure redirected the critique of reason that we found in the work of 
Horkheimer and Adorno. On the one hand, it acknowledged instrumental reason as a legitimate 
concern of the human species to gain control over its environment, on the other hand, it criticized 
the unreflected application of scientific standards and methods to the humanities and the social 
sciences where we are concerned with different forms of truths. In this configuration the concept 
of reason, respectively theory, loses its overpowering central position since it is conceived and 
applied in more specific contexts and is shown to be grounded in the lifeworld. Thus Habennas 
concluded: "The insight that the truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intention of 
the good and true life can be preserved today only on the ruins of ontology." (3 17) Although 
Habermas's later work did not continue this line of argument because its author had increasing 
doubts about the mode of transcendental grounding applied in Knowledge and Human Interest, it 
gives a clear indication of the general direction of Habermas's theory. It distinguished a variety of 
. forms of rationality and therefore also emphasized the need for a variety of critical approaches. 
Ideology critique was only one of several methods of analysis. 
In the ongoing discussion of the paradigm shift in Habermas's work the emphasis is mainly 
placed upon the so-called linguistic turn that was already suggested in Knowledge and Human 
Interest. Of equal interest, however, is the problem of historical reconstruction because it touches 
on the approach to social criticism. In his early work, Habermas, as we have seen, followed a 
Marxian trajectory in the treatment of the public sphere. During the 1970s, however, he critically 
revised his approach. Especially in Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (1976) he 
attempted to explore the enduring feasibility of a Marxian concept of history while at the same 
time another strand of his theory moved in the direction of a general theory of communication in 
which the traditional concept of reason had to be substantially redefined. Still, the question 
remains: how do they hang together? How, more specifically, does Habermas make compatible a 
theory of social evolution that remains indebted to the Marxian tradition and a general theory of 
communicative rationality that is based on linguistic theory? We may best understand this 
relationship as a three-tiered research project. To use a succinct formulation of Thomas 
McCarthy: "The ground level consists of a general theory of communication [...I, at the next level 
this theory serves as the foundation for a general theory of socialization in the form of a theory of 
the acquisition of communicative competence, finally, at the highest level, which builds on those 
below it, Haberrnas sketches a theory of social evolution which he views as a reconstruction of 
historical materialism. " (Introduction to Communication, xvii) 
I want to begin with what McCarthy calls the highest level, i.e., Habermas's theory of 
social evolution. While it claims to stand in the Marxist tradition, it does not retain many of the 
typical building blocks of Marxist theory. In this respect Habermas turns out to be a radical 
revisionist who reassembles and modifies traditional Marxism in order to recuperate its most 
important feature, namely its critical and practical intent. Part of this strategy is the inclusion of 
other theoretical traditions, among them phenomenology (Schiitz), pragmatism and fbnctionalism 
parsons, Luhmann) in varying degrees and forms. Thus Haberrnas argues: "I do not see, why 
these intentions (his critical intentions) would oblige me to take over more or less dogmatically 
the assumptions of a theory which is rooted in the 19th century." (Zur Rekonstruktion, 130) In 
his own approach problems of meaning (Sinn), aspects of action (communicative versus 
strategic), and hierarchies of communications (symbolically mediated interaction, propositionally 
differentiated actions, discursive speech) play an important role. Specifically, Habermas underlines 
the relevance of learning for the social system and its evolution. This emphasis is directed against 
traditional Marxism, on the one hand, and Luhrnann's theory, on the other. By emphasizing the 
crucial importance of learning processes and steering mechanisms Habermas distances himself 
from the Mamist assumption that the dialectic between the forces of production,and the relations 
of production can sficiently explain social evolution. In addition, this accent implies a critique of 
systems theory's belief that evolution can be sufficiently explained in terms of differentiation. 
In his important essay "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" (1976) 
Habermas tries to demonstrate how a materialist theory can both make use of Marx and must at 
the same time go beyond him. I can only briefly indicate in what ways Habermas deviates from the 
tenets of Manrian theory. (1) He holds that there is no need for a collective subject 
(Gattungssubjekt) that is treated as the substratum of the evolutionary process.. (2) The logic of 
the evolutionary process does not demand the assumption of linearity or necessity and continuity. 
Instead, he wants to access evolution by way of a consistent distinction between events and 
structures. These structures are the basis for evolutionaxy changes, but the actual process of 
evolution remains contingent and depends on specific circumstances. This is why the 
reconstruction of learning processes is of great importance for Habermas. (3) The observation 
and analysis of (increased) complexity does not suffice for a complete description of social 
evolution. More specifically Habermas argues that the primary importance of the economic 
system for social evolution , as Marx defined it, was not meant as a universal law but as a speciiic 
model of explanation for the transition fiom a feudal to a capitalist society. For a more plausible 
understanding of social evolution Habermas insists on a categorical distinction between 
communicative action, on the one hand, and instrumental and strategic action, on the other. By 
separating out communicative action he amives at a different understanding of the dialectic 
between the forces of production and the relations of production. Moreover, he distances himself 
fiom the Marxian assumption that the forces of production ultimately take the lead in social 
evolution and argues that neither the emergence of the ori@ civilization nor the origins of 
Western capitalism can be explained in terms of the impact of new forces of production (161). 
How, then, do we explain the major shifts in the social structure? Habermas's answer 
reads: "the species learns not only in the dimension of technically usefbl knowledge decisive for 
the development of productive forces but also in the dimension of moral-practical consciousness 
decisive for structure of interaction. The rules of communicative action do develop in reaction to 
the changes in the domain of instrumental and strategic action; but in doing so they follow their 
aun logic." (148) This means that the concept of the mode of production that underlies Marxian 
theory is, according to Habermas, not abstract enough, to explain the more general character of 
social evolution (167). Consequently, Habermas wants to move in the direction of increased 
conceptual abstraction to analyze organizational principles. This would include, for instance, a 
clear separation.of the mode of production, on the one hand, and the social formation that is 
linked to the dominant mode of production, on he other. ( 169) And more specifically he means 
to foreground the role of symbolic interactions, which Manrist theory has traditionally treated as 
secondary for the process of social evolution. This, then, is the place where a theory of 
communicative action begins to help in the conceptuahtion of social evolution. 
Let me give just one example to show how this approach would unfold in the description 
of social evolution. To pinpoint the transition fiom one stage to the next Habermas gives a pattern 
of attitudes and responses that define a specific phase of social organization. In the case of social 
evolution some of them are changed but not necessarily all of them. Thus Neolithic societies and 
early civilizations share a conventionally structured system of action (1 57), as well as mythic 
world views, but in the case of the developed civilization this mythic world view is already 
separated fiom the system of action and can therefore have a legitimating function for the ruler. 
There is no need in the context of my lecture to go into more details. What I do want to 
underline, however, is the general perspective of Habermas's understanding of social evolution. 
Where Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment treated the history of the modem 
world basically as the failure of rationality, Habermas views social evolution, which of course 
includes increased rationality, as a more neutral process. Not that he tries to derive general laws 
of progress from it as 19th-century evolutionists did, but he sees in human history a potential for 
more adequate social, political and moral solutions based on learning processes. Yet there is, as he 
repeatedly argues, no transcendent guarantee (Lessing) or metaphysical logic (Hegel). Habermas's 
understanding of social evolution is strictly post-metaphysical. In other words, Habermas's 
materialism has distanced itself fiom the belief in preordained laws of evolution. History can be 
theorized, but only through the intertwinement of empirical methods and a systematic theoretical 
framework . Strictly speaking, there is no place for the philosophy of history anymore which still 
guided Habermas's early work. 
Of course, the diierence between Habermas's early work and his mature writings is 
characterized by fimdamental changes in the theoretical grounding, changes that occurred at the 
level of the general theory of communication which Habermas began to explore in the 1970s and 
then articulated in the Theory of Communicative Action. The first major step was taken in the 
ground-breaking essay "What is a Universal Pragmatics?" that tried to reconstruct the universal 
conditions of possible understanding (Verstiindigung) and tried to ident@ them as basic to other 
for& of action such as codicts, competition, strategic action. Following Karl Otto Apel, 
Habermas focuses on speech actions and distinguishes four aspects of linguistic communication, 
i.e., the moment of utterance, the aspect of the content, the moment of articulation (the speaker), 
and, finally the aspect of reception by another person. Habemas claims; "The goal of coming to 
an understanding is to bring about an agreement (Einvers-dnis) that terminates in the 
intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord 
with one another." (Communication, 3) To be sure, this structure does not represent the average 
case of communication. Far fiom it. In most cases communication remains partial and incomplete, 
possibly hindered, mutilated, and subverted. In most cases, therefore, interpretation is necessary 
jr for speaker and recipient to achieve adequate if not ideal communication. For Habermas the 
., . . crucial question, however, is not the factuality of disrupted and partial communication but a 
reconstruction of the general conditions of communication. To put it succinctly: what do we 
4 P already presuppose when we speak of failure in communication? There are always validity claims, 
for instance, that can be afFmned or negated. In addition, there are grammatical structures. Hence 
Habermas distinguishes (1) the grammatical level, (2) the the level of intersubjective recognition 
(claims of truthfbhess), (3) the aspect of justification of validity claims (for instance through 
arguments, appeals to intuition etc.). Like Apel, Habermas thus underlines the importance of the 
pragmstic properties of language and distances himself from positivism,. structuralism or any type 
of linguistic theory that treats the pragmatic aspect of language as a mere empirical problem. 
The goal Habermas pursues with his analysis relies on a notion of a transcendental 
deduction. Yet the term "transcendental" does no longer cany the strong connotations it had in 
Kant's Fist Critique. Following the discussion of modem logic, Habermas is inclined towards a 
weaker conception of the transcendental which allows for adaptations and modifications in the 
analysis. 
It would be too time-consuming to develop the specific steps of the argument that is 
strongly indebted to Sear1 and Austin. Instead, I want to focus our attention on the result and 
specifically on the problem of the transition fiom linguistic to social theory. Why does a social 
theorist feel the need to integrate linguistic theory? The concise, although abbreviated answer 
would be: Habemas is concerned with what he calls "Geltungsanspriiche" that are, he argues, 
basic for social interaction. To underline this point I want to quote from the essay's final 
paragraph where Habemas summarizes his findings: "In speech, speech sets itself off fiom the 
regions of external nature, society, and internal nature, as a reality sui generis, as soon as the sign- 
substrate, meaning, and denotation of a linguistic utterance can be distinguished." 
(Communication, 68) With this statement Habermas foregrounds the linkage between language 
and the world in which humans live and act. However, in this scheme the hnction of speech is 
differentiated. Representation of facts correlate with the world of external nature, the social 
world needs speech for the establishment of legitimate interpersonal relations; and the world of 
internal nature (the subject) uses speech to disclose the speaker's subjectivity. In terms of validity 
claims we therefore have to distinguish truth, rightness, and trutwness (68). 
Now I am facing an impossible task, namely to sketch how Habermas's linguistic turn has 
effected his social theory in The Theoy of Communicative Action. This massive two-volume 
study (the Enghsh translation has almost 900 pages) proceeds simultaneously historically and 
systematically. It develops its argument by returning to older theories, for instance those of 
Weber, Durkheim, Mead, Lukacs, and Adorno, in order to fiame the theory of communicative 
action through a redemptive critique of the classics. Very much in the tradition of Critical Theory, 
yet even more consciously than the first generation, Habermas relies on a double strategy of 
critique and integration, which then leads to the articulation of the new theoretical position. 
To give you an idea of this position, I want to quote fiom the first volume: "Ewe assume that the 
human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that 
this coordination is established through communication--and in certain spheres of life, through 
communication aimed at reaching agreement-then the reproduction of the species also requires 
satisfing the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action." (1, 397) 
Rationality is clearly separated fiom the concept of instrumental reason, as we found it in 
Horkheimer and Adorno, or even a concept reason developed out of subjective consciousness. 
Instead, Habermas shifts the attention more to social action through communicative interaction. 
The social, in other words, cannot be achieved without language and speech. Social action 
depends on interpretive accomplishments. But, of course, the act of reaching an understanding 
does not exhaust communicative action. Rather, it prepares the coordination of social actions in 
which the particular aims of the agents come to the fore. (1,lO 1) As McCarthy points out: 
"Communicative competence is not just a matter of being able to produce grammatical sentences. 
In speaking we relate to the world about us, to other subjects, to our own intentions, feelings and 
desires." (Theory, i, x) To generalize this point, we can say that for Habermas the world is largely 
but not exclusively constructed through language. And it is through language that humans are able 
to foster a process of social organization that is at any moment incomplete and therefore in 
principle open to new levels of social development. In this process (which we have already 
examined) rationality plays an important role. "The rationality proper to the communicative 
19 
77 
practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it 
possible to continue communicative action with other means when disagreement can no longer be 
repaired with every-day routines and yet are not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of 
force." (1, 17- 18) Apart fiom its conventional or fbctional use, for Haberrnas language and 
communication contain a critical dimension that is crucial for social interaction and especially for 
cultural and moral evolution. What we have observed as a moment of idealization in the initial 
concept of the public sphere in 1962 now returns as the claim for a universal communicative 
rationality in 198 1. In short, the concept of reason must not be 'rejected but redirected, 
differentiated and delimited in its function. 
In the last section of my paper I want to turn to the emergence of a post-Habermasian 
version of Critical Theory. This trajectory should be developed in two directions. On the one 
hand, we would have to deal with the work of the third generation of critical theorists, among 
them Axel Honneth in Germany and Thomas McCarthy and Sheila Benhabib in the United States; 
on the other hand, we would have to address internal tendencies of returning to older theoretical 
positions or seeking an alliance with different theoretical traditions--trajectories that we would 
find in the writings of Peter Biirger, and Albrecht Wellmer. In some instances this return to 
Adorno or Benjamin is also characterized by a strong anti-Habermas sentiment. Habermas 
appears as the rationalist spoiler of Critical Theory. While the members of the third generation 
have by and large accepted the foundations of Habermasian thought and hence developed their 
critiques on the basis of this theory, the "outsiders" who are not directly ~ ~ ~ e c t e d  to the 
Frankht School as an institution, have been stronger in their resistance to the force of the theory 
of communicative action and all it stands for. This is, I feel, particularly true in the field of 
aesthetic theory, a field that has received only marginal attention in Habemas's writings. And 
again in the official transition from Haberrnas to Axel Honneth, who was recently appointed as 
Habemas's successor at the University of Frankfurt, the aesthetic question, which was so 
prominent in the work of Adorno and Benjamin, has been removed to the background. 
Before I address the situation of the third generation, I want to focus briefly on Peter 
Biirger and Albrecht Wellmer, who are only a few years younger than Habemas himself. Typical 
for both of them is a somewhat uneasy arrangement with Habermas's conception of 
communicative rationality which cannot easily be applied to the tradition of aesthetic analysis 
itom the early Lukacs to the late Adorno. Biirger is quite conscious of this tension when he 
explains in the first chapter of his 1988 study Prosa der Moderne that his concept of reason or 
rationalism is more indebted to the older tradition of Western Marxism than to Haberrnas. He 
talks about a "eingeschriinkter Begnff von Zweckrationalitat" (Prosa, 18) in distinction from 
Habermas's differentiated concept of rationality. Hence Biirger's central thesis returns self- 
consciously to the conceptual framework of the first generation of Critical Theory, for instance in 
the following definition: "Autonome Kunst entsteht als Antwort auf die Entfiemdungs- 
erfahrungen, die der Mensch in einer Welt macht, die sein Produkt ist und ihm doch iiberall als 
eine ihm fiemde entgegentritt." (Prosa, 17). In this view the process of social differentiation, 
which in Habemas's work is seen as neutral, takes on a definitely negative character: alienation 
becomes the very experience that modem art hasto oppose or subvert. Modern art, Biirger 
suggests, resists the process of differentiation as such, "wed der sie konstituierende FormbegnfF 
quersteht zum Be@ der Rationalita. " (1 8) It is quite consistent therefore that Biirger begins 
with a reconstruction of the category of the modem and modernism in the work of Hegel, Lukacs, 
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Essayisten gibt, dann ist es das Vertrauen auf das Abliegende. Von ihm erhofft er sich den Ansto P 
zur Verkehrung seines Wissens. Insofern teilt der Essayist mit Benjamin die swealistische 
Haltung des Emartens.. ." (Denken, 13) "Verkehrung des Wissens" signals a situation where the 
construction of knowledge, theoretical as well as empirical, has become a disappointing 
experience-Endzeitstimmung. One cannot fail to notice the growing pessimism in Biirger's late 
work-possibly one reason why all of a sudden Adorno seems to be a more attractive guide than 
Habennas. 
Once we turn to Albrecht Wellmer, we encounter both a different strategy and a distinct 
position. Unlike Biirger, he actually engages Habermas's theory and makes a serious attempt to 
join the Adornian problematics with the framework of the theory of communicative action. In 
f m ,  the essay "Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation" (1985) takes Habermas's critique of Adorno as 
its point of departure. Looking back at Adomo's work fiom the perspective of communicative 
rationality, Wellmer suggests that Adorno's epistemology, especially it subject-object split makes 
it virtually infeasible to grasp the "communicative moment of the spirit" (Persistence, 13); it forces 
Adorno to develop a theory of mimesis that has to fill the gap left by a too constricted concept of 
rationality. Wellmer follows Habennas in assuming that communicative rationality can overcome 
the conflict between subjectivation and alienation which in the writings of Adorno and 
Horkheirner had to remain an unresolved dialectical tension. Similarly, in the essay "Modernism 
and Postmodernism" Wellmer makes use of the concept of communicative rationality to engage 
Lyotard's conception of postmodernism by arguing that the pluralism of language games and 
institutions which are expected to overcome the tyranny of the enlightenment depends itself on a 
different form of rationality "But such a pluralism of institutions embodying the democratic self- 
organization of societies and groups would not be possible unless the fimdamental mechanism by 
which action is co-ordinated were to take the form of communicative action in the sense that 
Habermas has defined it." (Persistence, 92) Particularity cannot be purchased without a moment 
of universality and vice versa. In this line of argument the problem of modem democracy is not 
simply a matter of supporting pluralism against authoritarian rationalism. What is at stake "is a 
shared basis of second-order social habits: the habits of rational self-determination, democratic 
decision-making and the non-violent resolution of conflicts." (92) It is interesting to note, 
however, that Wellmer defends this position not through ultimate principles and deductive 
reasoning. Instead, he suggests that "we cannot expect either ultimate justifications or final 
solutions to our problems". (93) Nonetheless, he underlines the need for a universalist perspective 
that guides the permeability of the various modes of discourse. In other words, Wellmer wants the 
unitary notion of reason to be replaced by "plurality of interacting rationalities" (94). 
What I have shown s o ' k  is the strong Habermasian strand in Wellmer's thought. Yet 
ultimately more interesting is the question where and to what extent he-departs fiom the 
Habermasian position. While Wellmer stays convinced of the severe limitations of the 
epistemology developed in Dialectic of Enlightenment and views the weaknesses of Adorno's art 
criticism, at least in part, as its logical result, he takes the aesthetic theory of the first generation 
of critical theorists seriously and engages them both historically and systematically. In his search 
for an aesthetics of democracy, he carefidly distinguishes between moments of aesthetic 
traditionalism in the work of Adorno and the unfolding of the internal logic of Aesthetic Theory 
which he sees as determined by the dialectic of subjectivation and alienation, and specifically by , 
the notion of an encroachment of rationality into the work of art. 
At this juncture Wellmer opts for the impulses that have come fiom Benjamin's art 
criticism, in particular fiom his reading of modem mass culture, to distance himself fiom the 
Adornian cage of aesthetic autonomy. Following Benjamin, Wellmer argues: "I think that there is 
just as much positive potential for democratization and the unleashing of aesthetic imagination as 
there is potential for cultural regression in rock music and the attitudes, skills and modes of 
perception which have developed around it." ( Persistence, 33) Please note the structure of this 
argument, i.e., the rhetoric of bothland which hovers where Benjamin radically pushed the loss of 
aura as the necessary secularization of the aesthetic. But, of course, this process of democratic 
secularization, is already completely taken for granted by Wellmer and does no longer deserve the 
4 .1 defense that Adorno still put up. One senses even a certain impatience with Adorno when he holds 
. . f  on the concept of the autonomous art work in its classical or modernist version. 
However, this criticism of Adorno does not stand at the center of Wellmer's essay. As he 
points out in his summary, his main interest lies in the possibility of a recuperative reading of 
... . Adorno in which the concept of aesthetic truth is brought to the fore. What Wellmer wants to 
redeem is the moment of communication hi art, a form of non-violent communication that is 
inherent in the concept of truth. This reading contains an interesting interpretative shift since for 
Adorno himself the communicative aspect of the art work was of secondary importance. He was 
certainly not inclined to define the truth content of the art work in terms of communication. In 
fact, his rabid criticism of reception studies makes this very clear. It seems to me that Wellmer 
wants to create a bridge between the late theory of Adorno and the mature work of Habermas by 
focusing on the notion of the utopian. "The intention that has guided me in these reflections," 
Wellmer states, "was to release the truth-content of Adorno's aesthetics and develop it through 
critique and interpretation." (35) The idea of the utopian, one of the most essential and powefil 
categories of Critical Theory, enables Wellmer to reintegrate Adorno's work into the mainstream 
of second-generation critical theory. 
In many respects the third generation of critical theorists, most of them students of Jiirgen 
Habermas, follow a similar path. Among them Axel Honneth stands out as the perhaps most 
representative. His intellectual formation occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s in close 
proximity to Habermas, who taught for about a decade at the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg 
und returned to the University of FrankfUrt in 1988. For Honneth the paradigm shift within the 
Frankfurt School had already happened when he joined Habermas's seminar and later became his 
assistant. Consequently, in his own work the theory of communicative action rather than Negative 
Dialectics or the late writings of Benjamin became the point of departure. In this sense he 
represents the self-understanding of the School. Yet there is another side to his writings that is 
either absent or less developed in the thought of the second generation, namely a strong interest in 
and lasting familiarity with French structuralism and poststructuralism. Unlike his teacher 
Habermas, who remained a suspicious reader of his French colleagues,---the Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity provides good examples of this response---Honneth tried to develop his 
own position through the appropriation of French theory, especially through the appropriation of 
Foucault. This comparative strategy defines the approach of his first major study, Kritik der 
Macht (1985), but is also quite prominent in his essay collection Die Zerrissenheit des Sozialen 
(1990) that brought French social theory (Levi-Strauss, Merlau-Ponty,' Castoriadis and Bourdieu) 
to the attention of a broader German public. While Kritik der Macht still holds on to the 
perspective of the Fradcht School and ultimately favors the theory of communicative action over 
Foucault's analysis of power relations, the later essays demonstrate a greater appreciation of 
French thought as well as a broader and more generous framework of interpretation. What seems 
to attract Honneth to the French thinkers is the same moment that makes the older generation of 
critical theorists relevant again after Habermas's work had superseded them---the preservation of 
motives and themes that find no completely adequate expression in Habermasian theory, for 
instance the destructive character of the process of civilization. Thus Honneth characterizes 
Foucault in the following manner: 'Wur die gesteigerte Sensibilitat fbr jene Fonnen des Leidens, 
die aus der kulturell erzwungenen Abspaltung iiberschie P enden Trieb- und Phantasieimpulse 
stammen, macht die schwer konstruierbare Synthese versmdlich, die die wissenschafts- 
historischen Werke Foucaults darbieten: die ungewijhnliche Verschridcmg des Wissens des 
Gelehrten, der Kunst des Erziihlers, der Befangenheit des Monomanen und der Empfindlichkeit 
des Verletzten - eine Synthese, die in der Physiognornie Foucaults ja als Mischung von 
analytischer Ul te  und mitleidender Empfindsamkeit sich spiegelte." (Welt, 77) 
. Nonetheless, when Honneth turns to the substance of Foucault's work he notes the 
shortcomings as well, shortcomings seen fiom the perspective of a general theory of 
communication. In the essay "Foucault und Adorno" (1986) he underlines the failure of Foucault's 
early work in which Foucault unfolds the emergence and the passing of scientific discourses. 
Honneth interprets the shift to a theory of power in Foucault's later work as indication that the 
structualist approach to language and discourses had failed. It becomes quite clear that Honheth 
welcomes this shift as a significant step towards a social theory that is compatible with Adorno's 
late work. To make this point Honneth foregrounds the aspect of human suffering, especially the 
experience of bodily suffering as the common dimension of Adorno and Foucault. "Die 
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Konstruktion des Rationalitatsbegriffs ist bei Adorno wie bei Foucault von der mitleidenden 
Aufherksamkeit auf die Leiden des menschlichen Korpers geleitet; darin liegt die innere 
Verwandtschafl ihrer Kritik der Moderne." (Welt, 82) Common elements that Honneth 
emphasizes are the concept of rationalism, a notion of "leibhaftiger Subjektivitlit" (84), the 
conception of modernity in which the process of enlightenment turns out to be a process of 
disciplinary and rationalist control in society (totalizing critique of reason). 
Ultimately, however, Honneth stresses the difference between Foucault and Adorno. 
While Foucault means to demonstrate that human subjectivity is nothing but a field of 
manipulation, Adorno, following a Marxist analysis of advanced capitalism, intends to stress the 
deformation of the individual. In the final analysis, Honneth favors Adorno's critique of the subject 
over Foucault's deconstruction of the concept of subjectivity, since the latter approach strikes him 
as a reductive interpretation of the social along the lines of Luhmann's systems theory. The 
p r o d t y  of this critique to that of Habennas is fairly apparent. In Kritik der Macht Hometh 
offers a more systematic analysis of this line of interpretation.. The study develops two lines of 
argument to unfold the main thesis; on the one hand, Honneth traces the internal development of 
the Frankfurt School, in particular the phase fiom Adorno to Habermas; on the other hand, he 
uses Foucault's theory of power relations to provide a contrasting reading of the social problems 
that Critical Theory addressed at various stages and through various methods. In this regard 
Foucault might have a hc t ion  that is similar to that of Nietzsche for Adorno and Horkheimer-a 
force of resistance to the idea of the self-reflexive and autonomous subject, respectively to a 
subject-agent engaged in communicative interaction. 
Again, an even cursory look at the latest constellation of Critical Theory makes it apparent 
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that the history of the Frankfh School cannot be adequately conceptualized as a linear evolution. 
Honneth himself seems to be somewhat aware of this more complex configuration when he 
suggests in his essay on the genealogy of Critical Theory that one has to distinguish between an 
inner and an outer circle of critical theorists and then credits the "outsiders" such as Benjamin, 
Kirchheimer, Neurnann, and F r o m  with the preservation of a greater variety of theoretical 
models, which the inner circle failed to maintain because it was locked into certain thought 
patterns. The ideas of the outsiders would be picked up by the next generation, in particular by 
Jiirgen Habermas (and by extension, Honneth himself). Thus in a surprising move Honneth claims 
that Habermas had actually little in common with his teachers whom he defkes as functionalist 
Marxists (58). Instead, by developing the insights of the outsiders, Habermas arrived at a non- 
bctionalist social theory that "als der einzig ernstzunehmende Neuansatz dieser Tradition gelten 
darf." (Welt, 58) While I find the latter part of this argument unconvincing, I find the distinction 
usefbl and worth applying to the post-Adornian Gestalt of the Fr&rt School. We would have 
to turn to the work of Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt or to the writings of Peter Biirger and 
Christoph Menke, perhaps even to the essays of Karl Heinz Bohrer to find the unorthodox 
impulses that the School might need to break the gridlock of its present articulation. 
Still, the distinction betweeninsiders and outsiders, as suggestive as it is, fails to capture 
the entire history of Critical theory. The phenomenon of returns to older seemingly outdated 
forms of theoretical articulation and the moment of reiterations at a different level have been at 
least as important for the development of Critical Theory. For example, the early work of 
Habermas "returned" to the project developed by the Institute during the 1930s. During the 1970s . 
Negt and Kluge resisted the paradigm shift prepared by Habermas and "returned" to the Maxxism 
of the first generation. During the 1980s and 1990s Wellmer and Biirger again "returned" to 
Adorno's aesthetic theory to make up for deficits of advanced critical theory in the realm of 
aesthetics. Of course, this moment of a return is not to be taken literally as the expression of a 
dogmatic belief Rather, this move signals an awareness of the constraints of the dominant version 
of Critical Theory, i.e., the theory of communicative action, and the need for a new and fresh 
appropriation of previous.theoretical patterns. In other words, it is a learning process for the 
future in consultation with the past. 

